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Unemployment,  as measured by those registering at Employment  Offices, has risen very
gradually in Russia despite large order output losses and dislocations to  trade. By mid-1994
registered unemployed  was no larger than 2.1 percent of the labor force.  At first inspection, this
seems to tell a different story from experience  in transitional  economies  in Eastern Europe.  In the
latter, adverse shocks fairly rapidly translated into major employment adjustments in the state
sector.  Initially  these adjustments  were carried out by voluntary means; only afler some lag did
involuntary separations begin to  dominate.  The obvious questions that then arise are whether
these different  employment  to output elasticities  accurately  reflect a combination  of differences  in
the macrceconomic environment --  particularly  the  flow of  sublsidies  to  firms -- institutional
variation, as well as problems of measurement,  both with respect to unemployment  as also for
output itself ? As we shall see, registrations  data give a rather different -- and lower -- level of
unemployment  than survey-based  results, while output numbers are likely  underestimated  as they
do not adequately capture the effects of the stock adjustment - the growth in private activity in
trade and services  -- and associated  structural changes  taking place in the economy.
A  further consideration that  may explain this  different evolution is  the  underlying
preferences  and constraints facing firmns  - in part contingent on outside factors but significantly
related to inside control factors. Contrary to East European experience Russian firms have not
operated as if governed ex ante by a hard budget constraint. Indeed, there are many reasons for
thinking that employment,  rather than, say, output, has been the main factor determining  the size
and distribution  of subsidies. One result -- mixing  both elements  of benevolence  and self-interest  -
- has been the apparently widespread use of involuntary leave and short time work as firms
continue to  maintain some form of labor attachment with their initial stock of  workers.  In
addition, firms have borrowed from workers through wage arrears in large magnitudes. Average
lags in settlement of wage arrears have grown over time, hence imposing  a large inflation  tax on
settements.
The overall picture thus appears to be one in which finns and workers have traded wages
against relative employment  stability. Hours adjustment and lags in wage settlements have run
alongside non-trivial gross flows but little change to  net employment. The latter result can be
2traced to a combination  of adjustment  costs as well as expectations  with respect to future output
and hence likely  constitutes some form of labor smoothing  as well as benevolence. Even so none
of these motivations can satisfactorily explain why so many state -- often now privatized  -- firms
continue  to hire and report large hiring rates.
This paper is an attempt to sort out some of these apparent differences,  first by getting a
more appropriate measure of changes to employment  and unemployment. We then look in some
detail at the characteristics  nf the unemployed,  drawing  on a representative  nationwide  survey of
unemployed  individuals.  Finally, we discuss an important -- and hitherto  neglected -- feature  of
unemployment;  the regional dimension. We indicate some of the reasons for why the significant
regional differences  in unemployment  that are now beginning  to emerge may be long-lasting,  in
part because of the lack of labor mobility.
1.  Measurement
Russia:  Unemployment  and Vacancies
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Registrations  data appear to tell us that not only has unemployment risen gradually and
episodically  but that it remains a  small number (Fig. 1).  This appears to be consistent with the
evolution of  employment  as given in Fig.2 which shows a huge asymmetry  between adjustments
to GDP, industrial output and employment since 1990.  Further disaggregating  the changes to
employment and output in terms of regions tells us a similar story with one important addition;
3that there is significant  regional diversity  in the asymmetric  nature of the changes, with most of
the variation over regions entering  through the change to output rather than employment  (Fig.3).
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Unemployment stocks initially  climbed sharply in the first year of reform, but actually
declined  through most of 1993. Thereafter,  there has been a firther surge, resulting  by mid-1994
in roughly 1.5 million  workers being out of work  with nearly one million  in receipt of benefits.
Vacancies have sharply tailed off and the ratio of vacancies  to unemployment  has fallen  sharply
since mid-1993.  One argument explaining  this recent evolution is to  see acceleration as being
4associated  with the lagged effects of the fiscal  corrections and tighter monetary policy pursued in
the latter part of 1993 and carried over into 1994. Taken this way, the presumption is that firms
have increasingly  been forced to  separate labor as soft credits and other subsidies have been
squeezed.
Table  1: Unemployment  in Russia : Various Measures  1992-1994.1  (percent or  labor force)
1992  1993  1994 (March/April)
Labor Force Survey  4.8  5.5  5.9
VCIOM Survey  6.2  6.7
RLMS*  5.5
Registered  Unemployed  1.1  1.4  2.1
Notes: Labor Force  Survey 1992 and  1993 figures are mid-year,  RLMS relates  to August  1992; VCIOM
surveys relate to June 1993 and April 1994.
If we match up registrations with survey numbers, the apparent discrepancy is large, as
can be seen in Table 1 2 . The gap is of the order of 4 percent of the labor force or around 3
million individuals.  Note that the gap is almost stationary over the period 1992 to  mid-1994.
However, the Labor Force Survey numbers are not strictly comparable with OECD measures.
Aside  from  the  relatively infrequent applications of  these  surveys,  the  numbers do  not
satisfactorily  discriminate  over non-participants  and the unemployed. Indeed, roughly 20% of the
surveyed  unemployed  appear to be students and pensioners. However, it appears that, contrary to
common assumption,  Russia inherited a significant  stock of unemployed  from the Soviet period.
Further, despite the  size of  shocks, the upward drift in the survey generated numbers is not
particularly  substantial. The main movement  appears in the registration  numbers which have gone
from near zero to over 2 percent in just over two years.
Measurement  is further complicated  by the widespread and growing prevalence of hours
adjustment as one response of firms  to adverse  shocks. Adjustment  along the time dimension  has
2The srvey  numbers come from respondents  lacking work but available  and searching.
5been important and in some sense a counter approach  to outright labor shedding.  One implication
of course is that the productivity  decline in Russian industry  has been considerably  smaller when
factoring in time. Table 2 gives the evolution of short time and involuntary  leave since 1992.
Several features stand out.  The numbers of workers facing hours adjustment is quite large and
on a rising trend.  By 1994.ql over 14 percent of those employed in firms with more than 200
workers had either experienced  an involuntary  leave spell in that quarter or were subject to short
time.  Involuntary leave has dominated with average spells lengthening  through 1993.  For the
first quarter of 1994 the average spell  was around a month.
Table 2: Russia -- Hours adjustment and regional  range, 1993-1994
1993q1  1993q2  1993q3  1993q4  1994ql
Category
SHORT TIME (share of employed)
Russia  1.7%  1.6%  1.9%  2.8%  5.9%
max  10.1  8.0  8.2  9.0  13.5
min  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2
INVOLUNTARY  LEAVE (share of employed)
Russia  3.4%  4.9%  6.5%  8.6%  8.3%
max  13.0  15.4  16.8  20.4  16.0
min  0.3  0.6  0.3  1.2  1.0
AVERAGE DURATION  OF INVOLUNTARY  LEAVE (days)
Russia  18  18  24  29  19
max  49  47  63  64  45
min  5  9  10  15  4
Source:  Roskomstat  Data
[Note:  Data  arm  cumulative  and  cover  firms  with  >200  employeesJ
6The prevalence of short time work and involuntary  leave spells begs the question of what
this signifies.  Is this merely one manifestation of  firms' unwillingness to  separate workers
involuntarily  or is it part of a dynamic  adjustment  where de facto labor contracts arc more flexible
and allow firms to adapt to changes in relative demand  ?  Given  the fact that Russian  firms entered
the  transition with large labor hoarding, it seems at first inspection unlikely that  the  latter
explanation  is completely  appropriate.  Rather what we observe points to a clear employment  bias,
a bias that is likely  to have been exacerbated  by non-trivial  adjustment  costs.
Clari1fing  the nature of the hours adjustment  that is observed has obvious implications  for
how we measure unemployment.  For example, workers that remain in effect attached to  firms
with high probabilities  of  being put to work or shifting to full(er) working time should not be
viewed as unemployed  3.  The survey evidence presented in Section 2 allows us to discriminate
over a range of labor market states, including  workers subject  to some form of hours adjustment.
1.2 Changes to employment
We now attempt to get a better feel for the magnitudes  by accounting for changes from
the side of employment. Aggergate data indicate a net employment loss of around 4 percent or
around 3 million  jobs  between 1991 and 1993. Much of this contraction  has been concentrated  in
industry, which has accounted  for 36 percent of the aggregate employment  loss.  Offsetting  gains
-- largely  in self-employment  and private activities  -- are necessarily  imprecise  numbers. Even so,
putting the numbers  together in this way also allows us to account partially for the change in state
and private employment over this period.  It  is striking that the increase in private and self-
employment was roughly equal to  the loss in employment  in industry. What is clear, however,
from the adding up is that the gap is closed by the change in unemployment  and non-participation
of the order of 2.7 million  for end 1993 over 1991.  How exactly this is distributed over non-
participation  and unemployment  is still  unclear.
Movements  out of the labor force also appear to be large. Part of this can be construed as
a level effect consistent with a lowering of participation rates fromn  artificially  high levels.  In
addition, it seems likely  that job losses have been concentrated  on early retirees and on workers
more likely to leave the labor force, particularly  women.  Registrations  data show that the initially
3Movement  to shorter time work could be explained  either in terms of the demand side or by labor supply
responses of workers with preferences  for shorter time working, possibly  women and younger workers.
7high sharc of women  --  c. 70 percent at mid-1992 --  has declined quite  sharply over time,  By
early 1994 the share of women at just over 51 percent of the unemployed  was roughly equal to
their share in the total population.  It seems likely that part of this decline can be attributed to
movement  out of the labor force.  Experience  in Eastern Europe clearly indicates the importance
of non-participation  in the early period of transition and it seems likely that later flows out of
employment  will be mostly  absorbed  by growth in unemployment.
Putting together the changes  to employment  and unemployment  is, however, problematic
and largely so  for measurement reasons.  Using regional observations for 79  oblasts, Fig.4
indicates very large disparities in these respective rates of change.  The bulk of oblasts have
experienced negative  changes  to  employment significantly in  excess  of  the  change  to
unemployment. It appears that a 1 percent change in unemployment  has been associated with a
2.5  percent change in  empicyment.  The discrepancy can part be traced  to  shifts to  non-
participation, as well as non-registration, but also to coverage;  the data on employment  represent
only firmns  with more than 200 employees.  As most employment  growth is occurring in small
firms  and/or self-employment,  this likely  accounts for a good part of the gap.
In  short,  there  are  clear  measurement problems, particularly with  respect  to  non-
participation. Nevertheless, the clear impression is that unemployment  in Russia is significantly
higher than registered but that a significant  proportion of this additional unemployment  was a
cany-over from the Soviet period and that it has been only weakly trended since the start of the
reform period.
1.3 Flows
A feature of Russian unemployment  appears to have been the size of the flows out of
unemployment. Compared with the characteristic East European experience -- with low inflow
rates to unemployment  and yet smaller  outflow  rates -- Russian flows  to unernployment  have been
relatively small, while outflows -- including outflows to jobs -- have been large in  1992 and  1993.
We observe a clear shift upwards in the inflows  rate in the first quarter of 1994 with the monthly
rate approaching  0.5 percent. Fig. 4 also provides  a range for regional  inflow rates.  This range is
broad,  a  feature  we  return  to  later.  Outflow  rates  --  Fig.5  indicates  --  are  not  only  large,
averaging over 15 percent per month since 1992, but have remained  relatively stable.  However,
8there is a mild  declinc  in outflows  to jobs in 1  994.ql but the rate remained  in the range of  6-7
percent  per month  (Fig.6). And both  for  inflows  and outflows,  Fig.  7 points  to large  variation
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across regions over time. Clearly, we would like to know how much of the regional variation in
unemployment can  be  attributed to  inflows as  against differences in  outflow rates.  We
accordingly decompose  variance of  the regional unemployment  growth rates into variances of
inflows, outflows and covariance term."  This decomposition  shows that for the period 1992 -mid
4By  definition, we have  ar(u,.,  -u,e)  =Var(i,,,,)  +Var(o.,tJ,)-2Cov(iQ,+,,o,,,),  wherc uadenotes
unemployment  rate of region rat the  beginning of the priod  I and at the end  +1.  i and o  denote respectively
101994 variance of inflows to registered unemployment  across regions to the the total variance of
unemployment  growth is as high as 540% ( compared  to 444% in Bulgaria  or 375% in Poland)5.
At the same time variance of outflows from unemployment  is lower, representing only 283% of
the  total  variance of  unemployment growth.  This  suggests that  the  differences in  regional
unemployment  growth are driven largely by inflows. There is high covariance in movements to
and out of the regional  pools of unemployed.  At the same  time it is worth noting that inflows,
while largely explaining regional discrepancies in unemployment  are  still very low relative to
Eastern European comparators.
The  low  inflows rate  has to  be  traced  to  the  decisions of  firms. Firms can  pick
redundancies  as well as relying  on attrition. In addition, workers can of course quit their jobs. An
increase in separations  will show up on the inflows  side. What data are available,  we have already
indicated, suggest that separations' decisions  by Russian firms have been rather small relative to
the  size of  shocks to  demand.  Further, the  distribution of  separations over voluntary and
involuntary  components  is somewhat surprising.  Employment  Offices have information  providing
partial coverage on  flows to  unemployment and  their impulse and  they show that  lay-offs
accounted for roughly 30 percent of registrations. However, Goskomstat figures covering total
separations indicate that only 7-9% of separations through 1992 and early 1993 were from lay-
offs.  The clear impression  -- supported by firrn-level  surveys  6  --  is that involuntary  separations
have remained  small, amounting  on average  to no more than 25% of total separations  in the firm
sector. One implication  is that  a significant  part of the flow to unemployment  has to be traced to
apparently voluntary  decisions  by workers; subject  to an important  caveat.  That is, the boundary
between quits and involuntary separations may not be watertight; some proportion of those
quitting may indeed have little option.  Even so, assuming  that the voluntary component is still
large, the aggregate data indicate that workers likely attach a high probability  to  exiting from
unemployment;  a fact seemingly  born out by some survey  results reported below.
inflows and outflcws between  t and t+ I  all magnitudes  are expressed  as proportion of the average-period  labor
force).
5  T.Boeri, S.Scarpetta  "Convergence  and Divergence  of Regional  Labour  Mariet Dynamiics  in Central and Eastern
Europe"/ Paper presented at Technical Workshop  on Regional  Unmeployment  in Central and Eastern Europe,
Vienna, IHS, 3-5 November,  1994.
6As indicated in Conmnander,  McHale and Yemisov  (1994)
11A further set of features that are important in understanding  the evolution of the inflow
rate are, first, the non-trivial  shift of workers into non-participation  and, second, the use of hours
reduction by firms, hence avoiding any formal separation  of workers.
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On the outflows side, official data suggest that through 1992 ai d  1993 flows to jobs
remained not  only large -- accounting for over 40%  of total  outflows  - but  were  dominated by
flows to state firms, albeit  with increasing  flows over time to service sector and other jobs outside
of industry and agriculture. For 1992 and 1993, Fig. 8 gives average unemployment  spells for
those leaving unemployment  to jobs.  While  the spell  distributions  have shifted over the two years,
as  would  be  expected,  it  is  notable  that  between  60-80%  of  those  leaving  registered
unemployment  left within four months.  In short, for those transiting through unemployment  to
jobs, the average  unemployment  spell  was short; over a third of job finds were achieved  in under a
month in 1992 and roughly  a fifth  in 1993.
Nevertheless,  we can observe  a decline  in the aggregate outflow rate, as also the outflows
to jobs rate, in 1994. This change can be explained  in tenms of labor supply decisions  as also by
changes to job creation on the part of firms. Given the contractiorary macroeconomic  stance of
government in the last half of 1993, it seems  likely  that aggregate demand effects have dominated
12leading to a decline in vacancies and in flows out of unemployment. As benefits levels have
remained very low -- reaching on average no more than 15 percent of  the mean wage  in 1993 --
declining  search intensity  seems an implausible  explanatory  factor.
While the employment  decisions  of firms  is outside of the scope of¢  this paper, the flows
out of unemployment  to jobs hints at one of the particular features of the Russian transition; the
persistence  in hiring.  In any quarter of 1992  and 1993 roughly  5% of the labor force made a job
transition. Obviously,  a good part of these transitions  took the form ofjob to job transitions. But
the important result is that unlike in Eastern Europe where unemployment  turnover is very small
relative to measured flows of workers and jobs, in Russia unemployment  - at least as yet  --
cannot be characterized  as a stagnant pool 7.  And it is clear that most of the change in registered
unemployed  can be explained  by changes  to flows in rather than out of unemployment. This is not
surprising if we think of transition as a major shock to demand that cannot be accomodated by
natural wastage and small adjustments. Rather the enduring question concerns the reasons for
why the inflow  rate has remained  relatively  lowv,  given the size of those adverse shocks.
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One implication  of the above is that average  duration of unemployment  remains quite low
and the persistence  that now characterizes  Eastern Eureope  and many OECD countries has yet to
emerge.  Part of this, of  course, arises through expiration of benefits and the  shift to  non-
participation.  Fig. 9 is revealing  with respect to the distribution of registered unemployed by
7  For  Eastern  Europe,  see  Boeri  (1994).
13duration for four observations  between July 1992 and March 1994. Roughly half the registered
unemployed  were experiencing  a current spell  of under four months at any of these points in time.
Long term unemployed  (those in a current spell exceeding  one year) at the last time observation
were under 10% of  the total stock.  The overall picture is thus of relatively small flows to
unemployment,  alongside large  job-to-job flows, with high outflow rates and low unemployment
durations. But the picture is regionally  diverse, as we show  in Section 3 below.
2.1 Size and characterissdcs  of the unemployed: survey evidence
We have seen from the discussion above that  Russian unemployment  appears to  have
fallen in a surprisingly  stable band of between 5/6 percent since 1992. Registered unemployment
has climbed  mere sharply. But given imprecision  in measurement,  we choose to complement  this
data  with  information from a  nationwide and representative sample survey of  nearly three
thousand individuals  administered in May 1994. This section is based on the responses of 316
individuals  who reported being either without work or were currently in either a _pell  of short-
time work or involuntary  leave; the latter brackets an attempt to  get some idea of the size and
consequences  of hours adjustment  by firms.
2.2 Magnitudes
The distinction  over those without work and those with some residual attachment to the
firm is potentially  important,  particularly  if we think of hours adjustment  as a possible  measure of
any employment overhang.  The raw information on the  distribution over  these three basic
categories indicates  that  7.8 percent were unemployed,  5.5 percent were on short time work and
a further 3.1 percent were on involuntary  leave.  Table  provides some idea of the size of the
hours adjustment implied by either involuntary leave or  short time status.  Clearly, those on
involuntary leave have generally been subject to  far larger hours  contraction, even if  the
motivation for picking  for that hours adjustment,  as well as the duration, is common  across both
categories. In short, it appears that in March 1994 nearly 16.5 percent of the labor force was
either without work or else subject  to some measure of hours adjustment. As we shall see, taking
these numbers at face value is misleading  and significantly  overestimates  the scale of labor under-
utilization.
14Table  3: Short Time and Involuntary Leave: Adjusted Hours, Spells and Reasons
Short time  Involuntary leave
Mean  hours  worked  25.3  9.1
Distribution  of spells:  < 6 months  38%  37%
6-12  22  20
12-24  6  3
>24  months  1  0
Reasons:  Lack  of demand  42  40
Firm arrears  27  17
Inputs  shortages  24  30
Plant  overhaul  4  3
Labor  disputes  1  0
other  2  8
Soure  World BanidVCIOM Srvey
Table  is an attempt to provide in summary form some of the characteristics that make the
first inspection  somewhat  mriseading.  A number  of features are important.  In the first place,
roughly  6  percent  of  the  sub-sample  were  effectively  non-participants  and  conducted  no job
search (Category  2).  A sub-sample of those on involuntary leave appear  to  have been acting as
temporary lay-offs in the expectation of restarting  work with their current employer (Category 3).
And it  interesting  to  observe  that  nearly half of  those  waiting were  in  full time  work  by the
following month (April  1994). More  significantly, most who were on an involuntary  leave spell
had found altemative employment, generally of a secondary or informal nature.  What is meant by
secondary work ?  In half  the cases of  reported  secondary work, this involved self-employment,
almost exclusively in trade and services.  The other significant source of such work was in private
firms  8.  Those  on involuntary leave  and severely reduced  working  hours can be  split into two
groups.  The first  (Category  4) includes workers  with less than 20  hours per  week  in primary
employment.  The second group comprising roughly two thirds of those  on short time (Category
8However,  part of this secondary  work is probably  parasitic on or related  to primary state employment . Survey
results for mid-1993  had nearly 40 percent of secondary  work respondents  doing this work 'after-hours'; a feature
also found in De Melo and Ofer (1993).
155)  includes workers  with  less hours  adjustment; the mean was 30  hours per  week  in primary
employment.  These workers had little secondary activity, in part because the mean contraction  in
hours was no more than 25 percent.  The final group (Category  6) mainly incorporates  workers
without  primary employment  but with very significant secondary  or informal work.  Their mean
income was notably higher than for the other categories.
Table  4: Characteristics  of unemployed  and  marginally  employed,  March  1994
Category  I  Category 2  Category 3  Category 4  Category 5
in % to Total Sample  3.5%  0.6%  0.6%  1.4%  2.9
*w/o primary job  90.4%  100.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0
*in  involuntary  leaves  7.7%  0.0%  100.0%  33.3%  13.8
*on reduced work week  1.9%  0.0%  0.0%  66.7%  86.2
Registered  at FES  50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  4.8%  6.9
Spell > I year  17.3%  42.1%  0.0%  9.5%  4.6
Receiving  benefits  28.8%  5.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0
Exit rate to full time  3.8%  0.0%  47.1%  21.4%  32.2
job in April,  1994
Mean  income per  58.840  68.111  41.333  62.128  83.00
family  member, rubles
Females  58.7%  68.4%  70.6%  54.8%  60.9
Mean  age  (years)  34  33  41  41  4
Primary  education  21.2%  31.6%  11.8%  21.4%  9.2
Higer  education  13.5%  5.3%  5.9%  7.1%  27.6
Never  worked full time  12.5%  15.8%  0.0%  7.1%  2.3
Living  in rural  areas  26.0%  47.4%  17.6%  4.8%  16.1
Category  I = True  unemployed
Category  2 = Non-participants
Category  3 = Waiting  for  re-employment
Category  4 = Employed  part-time
Category  S = Reduced  work  time,  but  near  full time
Category  6 = Secondary  employment
Source:  World  Bank/VCIOM  survey,  April,  1994
16In  short, the  share of  the  labor force that  can  be  measured as unemployed in  an
ILO/OECD sense does not exceed 5.4 percent 9.  A further 4 percent were on involuntary  leave
or were experiencing  severe working hours reduction with little or no immediate  and alternative
employment options.  How notional was their attachment to the original firm appears to  differ.
But the  majority of those on  involuntary leave were clearly experiencing a temporary spell.
Further, an additional 7 percent of  short-timers were actually near to  full time work in their
primary -- state - employment  or else were working full time  in the informal  sector. This suggests
that taking  involuntary leave and  short time along a  continuum, the  choice of  the  former
correlated with the size of shock experienced  by firms.  But -- importantly  - nearly a third of
those working to a significant  degree in the informal  sector were registered as unemployed and
just under a quarter were receiving  benefits 'O.
Our survey results for aggregate unemployment  thus suggest that even by the end of the
first quarter of 1994 those strictly unemployed were just over 3 percentage points higher than
registered unemployed. One percent of the labor force in our reference period had passed to non-
participation  and the likely  immediate  'employment  overhang' - concentrated  in Categories 3 and
4 - amounted to no more than 2 percent of the labor force.
2.3 Who and where are the unemployed ?
Focusing on our measure of the 'true unemployed' (Category 1), we now turn to  some
simple attributes. Given data limitations,  at this stage we can only explore characteristics  within
our universe of unemployed  and hours-adjusted  workers.  In other words, the reported results are
conditional on being in this sample and hence are clearly biased ".  We estimate some simple
probit  equations relating current status to  a set  of variables summarizing individual-specific
information and including age, gender, educational level and location. Table 5 gives the main
results. The story is that the probability  of being 'truly' unemployed  is positively  associated with
the education level and with certain types of workers, mainly clerical staff.  Being laid-off is a
9  VCIOM estimates for June 1993 are 6.2 perct  against 6.7 percent in April 1994. They  are  higher than those
we  give as they consider  the unemployed  to be those without  primary work and not working at home. But
assuming the same distribution,  one conclusion  is that there is little trend.
" Hardly surprising, of course,  considering the level of benefits  and the monitoring abilities of the Employment
Service.
We will shortly be able to get a fuller picture with information  for the full sample of 2935 individuals.
17good predictor of unemployed status but the size of the coefficient and its significance  is little
different from that for quits, possibly suggesting that the latter category may camouflage an
involuntary  component. There also appears to be a link from location to unemployment;  those in
medium sized towns and in oblast centers appear to have a slightly  high risk of being unemployed.
Table 5: Probit  estimations
Dependent Variable: Category 1 status  Category 6 status
Vaniable  Coefficient  T stat  Coefficient  T stat
Age  -0.023  -2.833  -0.623  -1.199
Higher  1.198  1.566  0.559  2.069
Firm liquidated  1.233  2.564  0.196  0.354
Mass lay-off  1.645  7.308  0.501  1.986
Quit  1.56  5.552  0.685  2.436
Professional/ITR  -0.289  -1.154  -0.054  -0.197
Clerical  0.433  1.649  -1.039  -2.118
Female  -0.208  -1.155  -0.315  -1.578
Family  Size  -0.048  -0.723  0.101  1.87
Large City  0.412  0.897  0.371  0.857
Medium  0.548  1.643  -0.349  -1.003
Oblast center  0.340  1.047  -0.142  -0.437
Rural  0.417  1.221  -0.060  -0.171
Constant  -0.245  -0.510  -0.623  -1.199
The results of a similar  exercise  for our Category 6 --  those with significant  secondary or
informal work -- suggest that education level is positively associated with this status and with
location; residence in cities may be important.  The signs on the  variables summarizing the
transition  to  this  status  are  similarly signed  with  comparable magnitudes as  for the  'true
unemployed'.  The negative terms on both the age and gender terms points to the dominance of
you,iger males in this category.
As regards sectors of original attachment, over two  thirds originated in  state filns,
broadly defined with a fuirther  6 percent originating  with privatized entities and 7 percent from
private firms.  Sectors of origin correspond quite neatly to  the national distribution and the
employment  distribution  for the entire sample,  with over 40 percent originating  in industrial  firms.
Finally, we are able to get some idea of the spatial distribution  of the unemployed. This
suggests that the share of the unemployed in large cities and their environs, as also in medium
18sized towns, is significantly  lower than in the sample population as a whole.  Second, like in
Eastern Europe unemployment  appears  to have a rural bias and longer termn  unemployed  seems to
be disproportionately distributed in rural areas. And unemployment  in the oblast centers was
reported at least 5 percent higher than for the sample  mean.
2.4 Determinants  of registradon
We have found that just  over  a quarter of the  total sample of  316 individuals had
registered as unemployed .Half of the 'true unemployed' had registered and they comprised over
60 percent  of total registrees.  Interestingly,  18 percent of the registered were people with
significant  informal or secondary work and they further accounted for 26 percent of all benefits
recipients. In other words, registration does appear systematically  to exclude people with some
form of primary  employment.
But to explore the relationship  for those without primary or formal employment  between
registration  and receipt of benefits in more detail we ran two probit equations  relating those states
to various indicators. Table 6 presents the results.
Table 6: Determinants  of Registration  and Receipt of Benefits;  probit estimations
Dependent Variable:  Registrations  (n=66)
Constant  -1.39 *
Unemployed  with spell < 6 months  0.51
Unemployed  with spell 6-12 months  1.07*
Lost job through firn liquidation  1.69*
Laid off in mass lay-off  1.36*
Never worked full time  1.50
Dependent variable:  Receipt of Benefits  (n=55)
Constant  -1.66*
Without primary  job  1.23  *
With secondary  job  0.93*
Lost job through firm liquidation  0.91  *
Laid off in mass lay-off  1.08*
Female  0.16
Number  of family  members  -0.11
[*= significant  at 5 percent level]
19Registrations  are clearly positively associated  with length of current unemployment  spell
and with the type of separation  that induced the current unemployment  spell. Workers subject to
involuntary separations tend to  register, as do new entrants.  Receipt of benefits is evidently
related to lack of primary employment  and the involuntary  nature of the separation  but there is a
positive and significant  coefficient  on the secondary  employment  term . By contrast, age, gender,
professional status and location appear to play no significant  role in governing the decision on
registration or subsequent  receipt of benefits.
2.5 Transitons  and search
Focusing  first on the 'true' unemployed  , what routes were taken to this state ?  Nearly  45
percent were involuntarily  separated,  the bulk of which were through closures or mass layoffs.
But -- not surprisingly, given the information presented in  Section  1 -- as much as 35 percent  had
quit their previous  employment.  This feature is likely related to the relatively  high turnover in
unemployrnent  that we have already indicated. And indeed 25 percent of this category expected
on entering unemployment  to find a job immediately  or in a far smaller number of cases to  be
recalled by their former employer.
Mapping the respective  transitions across  jobs, unemployment  and non-participation  is at
this stage only possible  for a sample of  223 individuals  across our six categories.  The results are
quite revealing and are summarized  in Table 7. Rough hazard rates, classified  in tenns of the
impulse to a transition (a quit, involuntary  separation etc.), are calculated.  Transitions  to other
jobs are however over-estimated  as they refer to job offers and, at least for offers made through
Labor Offices we know that refusals are not uncommon 12 . Nevertheless, several points are
worth emphasizing. First, the hazard to jobs rate is quite high for all types of separations  as for
new entrants. Further, nearly 60 percent of those transitions to jobs were made to secondary or
infornal activity  and the probability  of either a quitter or a new entrant moving  to an informal  job
was very significantly  higher.  In addition, 13 percent of the sample made a direct job-to-job
transition.  Second, near on 10 percent moved to non-participation,  with this route significantly
more lik-ely  when the separation decision  was voluntary. This evidently  picks  up the flow of older
workers and women to out of the labor force.  Third, for over 30 percent of those making a
" 2For mnid-1993  a VCIOM survey of 1016  registered,  urban unemployed  indicated that for those receiving  job
offers roughly 50 percent made one or more refusal.
20transition, unemployment was the  destination, with  clearly higher probabilities attached to
workers separated by mass lay-off  or firm liquidation's  and new entrants.
Table  7:  Factors inducing a job transition  and probable  new status of those leaving a job
Transition  Share  Non-Partic-  Primary  Secondary  Unemployment
Route  ation  Work  Work
Liquidation/  .33  .10  .25  .15  .50
Laid-off
Other Invol-  .11  .11  .63  .37  .40
Separations
Quits  .24  .25  .20  .20  .35
New Entrants.16  .10  .27  .73  .52
Job-to-job  .16  - .86  .14  -
Source: World BankVCIOM  survey
While  it  appears  that  registration  rates  were  reasonably high,  job  search  was
predominantly  done through friends and relatives. This was a common pattern across all those
who registered.  It  is clear that responses to  posted vacancies and visits to  firms were also
important, but  it is  revealing that  nearly 20  percent of the  registered attached little or  no
probability to  finding a job through the  Employment Office.  The institutional matching of
workers to jobs appears not to be that powerfiul. And the general impression is of information
and other inefficiencies  in matching  that translate into longer search times and a reasonably high
level ofjob rejections  for offirs generated  through Employment  Offices.
The spatial scope of job  search  is obviously important.  Due  to  institutional (e.g.
propiska) and other rules mobility  across regions remained  very limited. The survey suggests that
this is a clear stylization  we can accept.  Almost two thirds of  the sample (Categories 1-6) when
asked what preconditions existed for moving to  work in another region replied that under no
circumstances  would they be induced to move. Higher wages or employer provided housing or
employer-bome reallocation costs  were cited  by only 25  percent of  respondents as  being
meaningful preconditions.  For the  'true  unemployed' the distribution of responses was very
similar.  A probit estimation relating the refusal to  move to  a set of individual or household
21attributes indicated  that older individuals,  inhabitants  of cities and those with higher skills  have a
clear low propensity to accept mobility. The inverse  appears to hold for rural and medium  sized
town residents but few of the coefficients  are significant.  The implications  of such apparent labor
immobility  for relative  regional  unemployment  is explored  in more detail in Section 3 below.
2.  6 Durations
For the 'true unemployed'  the exit rate to full time employment  in March was 4 percent
and hence quite close to the 5 percent exit rate for all registered unemployed reported by the
Federal Employment Service.  This exit probability is quite low and would imply an expected
completed duration in excess of two years in steady state.  Yet looking at the distribution of
current unemployrnent  spells  we find that the average speD  was no longer than six months, with
over three quarters of the true unemployed  currently in an unemployment  spell  of under one year,
with  the  majority under  six months (Table  8).  The  evident impression is  that  long  run
unemployment  has yet to emerge.
Table 8: Unemployment  spell for 'true unemployed'  (Category  1)
Average spell:  6 months
Including  new entrants (n=104)
< 6 months  42.3%
6-12 months  34.6
12-24 months  10.6
>24 months  6.7
No response  5.7
New entrants (n=13)
< 6 months  69.2%
6-12 months  30.8
Excluding  new entrants (n=91)
< 6 months  69.2%
6-12 months  35.1
12-24 months  12.0
No response  6.8
Source: World Bank/VCIOM  survey,  April 1994
222. 7  Income
We are constrained in the analysis by having only one income measure; average income per
household for March 1994. However, the variation in family size is small across all categories.
This suggests that family size differences  are unlikely to be a major explanatory factor behind
variation in average income.  Second, while there is clear and large dispersion  in income within
categories, the variation is mean income across categories is less than we might have expected,
considering  regional  and other particularities.
Distribution  of Income,  April 1994
VCIOM  survey.  293 obsrvfiorf
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Fig. 10 provides the distribution of monthly income separating out the unemployed from the
other categories in our sample.  The distributions  are fairly similar,  though the unemployed  have
an obviously higher share of families  at toward the tail of the distribution. Average income for
'true  unemployed' households was  around 85  percent of  the  mean for  the  fuller sample
(Categories 1-6) and just under 75 percent for the total  sample  13  Clearly,  those without work
or partially  employed do have low relative  reported incomes as indicated  by the true unemployed
with a mean income under 60 percent of the national mean as well as those on voluntary leave
without secondary work (Category 3) . Yet it is worth stressing that workers with substantial
13  The mean per caput income for the total sample (viz.; 2935 individuals)  was 79,945 ribles.  This is vezy
significantly  below  the number - 125,000  Rubles  - given by Roskomstat  for March 1994. The first is more likely
to be a proper measure  as the lattcr include notional tax rebates and wage arrears in their estimates of current
income.
23secondary work and those on limited short time report average incomes in excess of the larger
sample mean. Taking the ratio of  the income of the unemployed  to the range over Categories 5
and 6 as parodying  the relationship  between the reservation  wage and its mark-up, the picture is
of a 40 percent gap.  This appears to be true both with respect to income derived primarily  from
state sector work as from largely self-employment  or private sector work.
We  experimented with  a  standard  logarithmic incomes function where  the  vector  of
independent  variables includes those indicating  different levels of education and skill, current or
former attachment and other characteristics  14 . The estimation  indicates reasonably  conventional
returns to education and skills.  Average income is significantly  and negatively associated with
current or prior attachment to  state firms, including industrial firms, as well as a rural location.
Income is quite clearly negatively associated w-ith  being unemployed --  as measured by  our
Category 1. By contrast, there is an unambiguously  positive association  with secondary  work .
3. Regional Dimensions
3.1 Framework
Figures 11 and 12 highlight  the emerging differences  in regional unemployment  rates, as
measured by registrations and by an adjusted measure where involuntary leaves are included.
Both measures are biased; the first downwards; the latter upwards.  Even so, they show quite
strikingly how large has  been the  range of  departure from near-full employment.  Taking
registrations data first, by early 1994 we find a range of 0.5 - 8 percent across regions; for the
adjusted measure the range extends from 2 - 28 percent.  Where we can correct the involuntary
leave component  by an average spell per region per quarter, the range shifts  to  I - 11 percent.  So
whatever measure we use, several common features stand out.  Relating unemployment over
these two measures  in mid-1992  to the levels in early 1994  we find very significant  and across the
board increases across oblasts. The dispersion in unemployment  rates across regions is clearly
increased once we include involuntary leave. At  mid-1992 the  coefficient of variation in the
unemployment  rate was 0.4, by 1994 it had shifted  to 0.7.
14  Obviously  this is not  that informative,  as the  data relate  only  to individuals  in the sample  of 316  unemployed  or
under-employed  workers.  The  main  finding  for this sample  is that income  is negatively  associated  with being
'tnzly  unemployed'.  Results  available  on request  from  the  authors.
24Unemployment  Rates 1992-1994,  Adjusted measure
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This dispersion in regional unemployment rates is hardly surprising, after all different
regions have received different  magnitudes  of shocks. What is more interesting  - and obviously
more difficult -- is to  understand how divergent regional unemployrment  will remain and for how
25long. Certainly,  we can see few reasons for convergence  in the forseable  future. Absence of the
earlier equalization  mechanisms  -- particularly  of a fiscal  nature -- would accentuate divergence  as
would the absence of labor mobility. We have seen from the survey  results that the unemployed,
for example, are extremely  reluctant  to move in line with wage or other advantage. And this is
doubtless  consolidated  by institutional  and other restraints  on inter-oblast  mobility  of labor.
Regions  produce different  mixes of goods and hence experience  potentially  quite different
shocks  to labor demand . Shocks  to a region's labor demand  ought to lead to changes in relative
wages and employment;  assuming  that they face a broadly similar  macroeconomnic  environment.
In practice, in Russia regional administrations  appear to exercise large discretion, extending to
price controls as well as wage and employment  decisions. For instance,  they may  choose to slow
the rate of employment  decrease  through hours adjustment  rather than picking separations  as the
response to an adverse labor demand shock. These components  may lead us to think that in the
short run at least shocks will generate different responses. But a key feature that differentiates
Russia, say, from North America  is the far lower degree of factor mobility. In particular, little or
no movement  of workers across regions can be expected in response to a shock. Empirical  work
on the US, for example,  indicates  that while  shocks to relative  region enployment tend mostly  to
be permanent, this is not the case for relative unemployment. The latter is untrended with little
persistence.  Blanchard and Katz (1994) explain this largely as a function of worker mobility.
Adverse labor demand shocks impel  workers to move with the result that while employment  may
not increase,  unemployment  will fall as workers migrate. A further finding  is that relative  nominal
wages have not declined sufficiently  to prevent increases in unemployment  and there has been
quite strong convergence  over time in relative  wages.
These findings  from a context of high factor mobility  are suggestive  once we start thinking
about Russia. In the first place, once the system is constrained in terms of factor mobility  we
might expect  adverse labor demand  shocks to regions to lead to differences  in emnployment  and
unemployment changes which would be quite large and persistent.  We could, for example,
imagine  that an inability  of workers to move, coupled to relative wage rigidities arising  from the
institutional setting  and  associated to  the  one  country setting,  would  result  in  relative
unemployment  being strongly  trended and persistent.
26Further, while workers cannot in general move, this constraint may be less binding for
firms who can pick regions. Below, we make the probably optimistic assumption  that capital is
mobile in Russia. This implies that while relative regional wages will be unaffected by labor
movements,  decisions  on job creation could be affected  by relative regional  wages. The sensitivity
of relative nominal wages to  region conditions is obviously critical.  The greater the degree to
which region wage setting is dissociated  from region activity levels, as through a national wage
rule, the weaker the likely  play-back from relative region wages to job creation.  We provide a
more formal presentation in the model written in Appendix 1. While it is clear that at this stage
we have limited options for directly confronting  regional data in a manner consistent with our
model, we can begin to  look at the respective relative movements in wages, employment and
unemployment.  We turn first to wages.
3.2 Wages  and dir  la*wvepaths
We start with what we know about  the wage path  at an aggregate  level.  Fig. 13 demonstrates
that real consumption  wages have hardly moved fiom the floor set after the Januamy  1992 price
shock 15 .
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15 Trhis  is not  tme  for  dollar  wages  which  expanded  by  over  ten times  between  January  1992  and early 1994,  largely
through  the  real  ruble  appreciation  that  occurred  in 1993.
27This restraint  cannot be mecahnically  inked to the presence of a binding  wage nonn or system of
constraints. As Fig. 14 shows,  the aggregate  wage bill  consistendy  exceeded  the wage norm and by
large  cumulative  magnitudes.  Further,  the absence  of a punitive  marginal  tax rate on above-norm  wage
payments  diluted  the regulatory  effect of the norm. However,  the wage norm and the structure of
regional  relativities  does inhibit  the degree  to which  wages  can be set at a regional  level.
Wage Norm, Wage Bill and Wage Arrears









u  an.9  Jan.  9  Jan.9
Wage  Norrn  Wage  Bill  ,  Wage  Arrean
Figure  14
The apparent  wage  moderation  that  we observe  in the aggregate  is if anything  magnified  by the
presence  of wage arrears. Though  these have  been  far from  large  through  most of the recent  period --
amounting  to under 10 percent  of the aggregate  wage  bill and  reasonably  concentrated,  and they have
become  far more significant  in 1994. The obvious  implication  is that acta  as against  notional  wages
have commonly  been smaller  given the inflation  tax on arrears. So, using aggregate  information  the
clear impression  is that wages have remained  at low levels  with little drift in the changes. A crude
indexationto  prices  appears  to hold  until  early  1994,  at which  point  there is a downward  shift.
The obvious  question  that we need  now ask, in the light  of the set-up above,  is what has been
the response  at lower levels  of aggregation  and what does this tell us about the relative  response  of
regions  to relative  shocks,  assuming  that a fall  in the relative  value of labors product  could  be expected
to reduce labor demand  7 The depth of this contraction will  in part depend  on whether  or not wages
can fMliy  absorb the shock.  A large relative  shock should be associated  with a comparable  relative
wage adjustment. And  because benefits'  levels  have  been very low - below subsistence  levels  - they
have  placed  no significant  floor on the potential  adjusunent.
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An  obvious starting point is to  examine the path of relative wages, employment  and
unemployment  given  the initial  conditions.  Fig 15 does precisely  that by relating  the anmal average
change  in nominal  wages to the log wage in 1992.ql.  The clear upward sloping  line  that could be
fitted  to this picture suggests  strongly  that wage changes  have  tended  to act on and possibly  amplilf
the initial  structure  of relativities.  The same  exercise  is hard to repeat  for region employment,  pardy
because  a comparable  data series  is not available  save  for 1993.ql  - 1994.ql. Fig. 16  attempts  a similar
exercise  to that for wages. While  again  the fitted fine  would slope  upwards,  the amplification  of the
initial  conditions  is less  and changes,  given  the refeence, are more convergent.  In addition,  inspection
of witin  penod changes  indicates  that changes  in relative  employment  within  and across the sample
period tend to be consistent.  Finally,  referring  back to Figs. 11 - 12 we can see that relative  region
unemployment  rates cannot  be simply  explained  as an amplification  of the earlier structure  of relative
rates, taken at August 1992. Both for adjusted  and registered  unemployment  measures,  wewould be
able to fit an upward sloping line, but, particularly  with the first measure,  we also find significant
dispersion.
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The above features b  the question  of whether  the changes  in wages can be systematically
related to  changes in employment  or  uremployment,  using region observations. Clearly, in the
presence  of regionally  diferentiated  shocks,  we would expect  not ordy  different  magnitudes  of shock
to employment  but some clear play-back  to wages. Given  gaps in the employment  series, henceforth
we  work  with the  unemployment  mnubers.  As  such we  are  assuming that  relative region
unemployment  and wages  are not simply  expansions  along  the same  distrbution.
To sort  these features  out sisfactorily, we start with some simple  scatters  for the first quarter
of  each year from  1992 through 1994, relating changes in  nominal wages to  the  adjusted
unemployment  measure,  both variables  being regional  observations.  The observations,  including  the
data on which  the regressions  reported  below  were estimated,  cover 72 out of the 79 oblasts  in Russia
Figures 17-19 unambiguously  charts the emergence  of an apparently  convenfional  link from region
unemployment  to region  wages, so that  by 1994.qI we observe  a clear inverse  association  between  the
change in wages and unemployment. At the stat  of  ransition,  we observe  no evident relationship
between  a region's  unenployment  and  changes  to wages. Gradually,  this changes  and the sensivirty  of
region  wages  to region  unemployment  grows  over time.
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Further, Fig. 20 indicates  for the same period that the change in a region's  relative  wage is
inversely  associated  with a region's  relative unemployment  rate.  In other words, regions with high
relative  unemployment  rates  in 1994.ql experienced  deterioration  in their  relative  wages.
To explore the apparent emergence  of this equilibrating  mechanism,  we set up a panel of
monthly and quarterly observations  allowing us to  relate the change in region wages to  region
unemployment  and current and lagged region consumer  prices; a standard derivation  of the Phillips
curve 16*  The results  were not particularly  promising.  While  the coefficients  were predictably  signed
and significant,  both the quarterly and monthly estimations  had low overall explanatory  power.
Further,  the F statistic  in the fixed  effects  estimate  was very low, indicating  too much  variance  within
sample  to warrant  pooling.  Indeed, inspection  of individual  region wage observations  indicated  very
large variations  across  periods. This  was true for both monthly  and quarterly  estimations.  In addition,
the likely  sensitivity  of the relationship  to the time specification  - given  the scatters  presented  above  -
points  to use of cross sectional  estimates. Accordingly,  we re-estimate  on two cross-sections,  1994.ql
6 Of the fonn, w,,  = at - a2U,,+  a3P,,+  a4(1-app  -
32over 1993.ql and 1993.ql over 1992.ql.  The specification  is in first differences  and logs with the
wage  and price  vanables  set up in index  form and based  to December  1991. Given  the size of monthly
inflation  over this penod, we suppress  the use of a lagged  price  term. The results  are listed  in Table 10.
The variables  are predictably  signed  and significant  at more  than the 5 percent level,  even  if the size of
the coefficients  is quite small. However,  the overall  fit of the estimation  improves  over time.
Table 10: Wage equations: Cross-sections,  1994.111993.1  and 1993.1/1992.1
DlnWage93  2.01C  - 0.01U93  +  0.14DInRPI93
(19.23)  (-1.78)  (2.81)
R2= 0.14; s.e=0.10; mean of dep variable  =2.26; Durbin Watson=1.52;  F stat=5.68
DlnWage94=  2.32C  - 0.02U94  +  0.29DlnRPI94
(11.82)  (-4.45)  (3.11)
R2= 0.34; s.e.=0.14; mean of dep variable  =2.73; Durbin  Watson=1.52;  F stat=18.27
At this stage, we can draw the condusion  that regional  wage setting has begun to be more
responsive  to region  unemployment.  There is a clear inverse  relationship  between  the unemployment
level and changes  to nominal  wages, although  the size of the price coefficient  is rather low.  Since
transition  began in Russia,  changes  to relative  wages have very clearly  dominated  changes  to relative
unemployment  or employment;  reinforcing  the general  impression  that  wage flexibiity  in aggregate  and
across  regions  has been a powerfhl  feature  ofthe transition  so far.
3.3 Relative employment and nismatck
The evolution of relative  employment  is less easy to  deal with, largely because of data
limitations.  As a result, we have  to limit  ourselves  to working  with unemnployment  numbers,  assuming
that they can tell us pretty much the same (mverse)  story. Here, our presumption  is that changes  to
relative  region  employment  will  be potentially  large  and persistent.
That there is growing  dispersion  in both regional  vacancy  and unemployment  rates is dear.
Combined with what we know about labor mobility, we could reasonably  expect to  find rising
mismatch  in the labor  market. Such  mismatch  could take several  obvious  forms;  age, gender, skill  and
33regional dimensions  being those commonly  explored.  In our discussion,  the regional mismatch  is
particularly  interesting  but it is also wordt noting  - though we are unable  to go firther with this at this
stage  - that  the bulk of vacancies  posted  at Labor  Offices  have  been for manual  workers. At 1994.ql
these accounted  for around 85 percent of total vacancies  and the share has remained  stable since  the
start of transition. Yet we also know that the bulk of involuntary  separations  have  been concentrated
on clexical  and professional  workers,  a high  proportion  of whom  have  been  women. This may  suggest
the presence  of skDll  imbalances.  In any event, it suggests that the matching  of workers transiting  in
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Turning  to the regional  dimenson, lack of labor mobility  could be expected  to accentuate
divergences  in the distribution  of unemployment  and vacancies  across  regions. In Eastern Europe, the
e-vidence  suggests  that regional  mismatch  between  unemnployment  and vacancies  has increased over
time. Using regional  data, we calculate  a mismatch  index  that takes Into account  unemployment  and
34vacancies  17  The story is clear (Fig. 21). The index grows throughout  the period rising  from 0.2 to
over 0.5 in 1994. Although  cross-country  comparisons  are problematic,  the measure points  to quite
high mismatch  at an early stage in the transition.  The same  measure calculated  for Poland in 1992,
when regional  dispersion  in unemployment  and vacancy  rates was greater  than in Russia  through 1994,
gave monthly  mismatch  in the region of 0.17 to 0.25 ".  And spatial  mismatch  would be one factor
influencing  the impact  of vacancies  on outflows  to jobs from  unemployment.  We now explore  in some
more detail the way in which such outflows to jobs -- as the best proxy for hiring - responds to
changes  in the stock of unemployed  and  vacancies  19.
3.4 Effciency in matching
We have seen that, relative  to Eastem Europe, flows  out of unemploynment  to jobs have  been
large. Our survey results pick out the importance  of inforrnal  sector jobs and self-employment,  but
even so the flows  into sLate  and  privatised  firms  remain  surprisingly  large  20  The bulk of flows  out of
unemployment  to jobs are in fact to the latter. How much  does this tell us about the efficiency  of the
matching  process ?  Several  points  should  be made at this stage. First, the numbers  on the stock of
unemployed  are biased downwards  as we are using registrations  numbers. Second, information  on
vacancies  largely  relates  to 'formal'  sector  jobs and hence refers  mainly  to the state and privatised  firm
sector. Third,  while we are exploring  the interaction  between  outflows  from unemployment  and the
lagged stock of unemployed  and vacancies,  this obviously  provides  a somewhat  dubious measure  of
efficiency.  Why ? Because  we know that the bulk of Russian  firms  entered transition  with large  labor
hoarding, the contraction  of which has proceeded only gradually.  In Section 1 we have already
indicated  that part of the slow run down in employment  can be attributed  to the association  between
firm  size, as measured  by employment,  and subsidies  received  fromh  government  and/or the financial
system.  One result has not only  been  the restraint  on involuntary  separations  and ultimately  on inflows
to unemployment  but also  the relatively  high  hiring  rates  reported  by state firms. In other words, much
of the hiring  from unemployment  is likely  to be accounted  for by state or privatised  firms  and, hence,
" 7Calculated  as;  Mismatch = 0.  5  Ni / N(I(vi - ui) - (v - u)J)  where u-unemployment rate; v=vacancy
rate; ui=unemployment  rate in region 1;  vi=vacancy  rate in region  L, N=total labor force and Ni=region labor  force.
Is See  Coricelli,  Hagemejer  and Rybinski  (1994)
"
9As to the reliabili"" of vacancies  data, we suspect this to be less of a problem in Russia than in most OECD
settings, partly because of the inertia of previous  practices - including  the requirement on firms to post vacancies -
- and the relatively limited development  as yet of an autonomous  private  sector.
20 Yemtsov (1994).
35may in effect be for the 'wrong' reasons.  This has obvious implications  for how we interpret the
matching  function results.  Constant returns, with the implication  of a constant rate of growth of
unemployment  consistent  with balanced  growth, would  hardly  be an appropriate  characterisation  for a
setting  where  labor hoarding  was large. Rather, decreasing  returns  in matching  could  be interpreted  as
a  desirable 'inefflcienc~,  signalling perhaps, an end to  the  dynamic labor hoarding apparently
characteristic  of the Russian state (now privatised)  finn sector.  Given the relatively  early stage of
transition,  we might  further  expect  a less than proportional  association  between unemployment  stocks
and outflows.
We now present  the results from estimating  an aggregate  matcling function,  first proceeding
with  the general  formn  with a Cobb-Douglas  specification,  viz; 0,f =  A,,U,, Vft,  where 0 = outflows
from unemployment in ith region; U = stock of unemployed and V = stock of vacancies.  No
'technological progress' would give a constant multiplier  over time.  Taking logs the standard
estimating  equation becomes;
ln(OQ,)  = ln(A,) + a.  ln(Ua  ,-,) +-flln(V;.,,) + g'u
Our data cover the period January 1992 to  April 1994 for all 79 administrative  regions.
Introducing  a one period lag for the right hand side variables  gives  us a reiirence of 27 periods and
2133 observations.  For efficient  estiation,  exploiting  both cross section  and time series  components,
we pool the data and allow  for heterogeneity  across  region  and  time.
Assuming  that the stock of registered  unemployed  represents  a constant sample  of the  true
unemployed'  and that vacancies  accurately  represent  job openings  in the 'formal'  sector, we are in effect
attempting  to measure  the 'efficiency  of matching  in one - albeit  very large -- segment  of the labor
market. Clearly, as indicated above, this is a  'conditional'  efficiency.  But given the  size of the
autonomous  private  sector,  this is informative.
The results  are presented  in Table 11 for a pooled  OLS estimate.  Time  dumnies are introduced
in both estimations.  The coefficients  are positively  signed,  their  size is rather stable  with or without  time
dumries, and are highly  significant. Introducing a penod dummy  to capture a distnct phase  from
March through September 1993 when unemployment  was faling did not  affect the  size of the
estimated  coefficients  n-or  their significance.  The size of the vacancies  term is quite  large and suggests
that, compared  with these resuks reported  in Boeri (1994)  for a range of Eastem European  countries,
36there is a relatively strong effect of vacancies on outtlows to jobs. The size of the coefficient on the
lagged unemployment  term is also reasonably  large.  Even so, the matching function exhibits
decreasing  retums  to scale  21,  indicating  that a doubling  of unemploymrent  and vacancies,  say, would
be associated  with a less  than  proportional change  to outflows. Decrcasing  returns  could be attributed
in part to the lack  of development  of the labor  market,  institiutional  inefficiencies  as well  as congestion
effects.  The inclusion  of time dummies  in principle  allows  us to capture the efficiency  of matching
over time. The coefficients  decrease  over time likely  indicating  the deterioration  in the efficiency  of
matching.
Table 11: Matching  function for 79 regions  of Russia
Procedure: OLS pooled estimates with Time Dummies;
Dependent Variable: Log Outflows
Variable  Coefficient  T-stat
Log U,,  0.516  32.04
Log V,-l  0.337  24.96
Constant  -1.016  -7.48
R2 =.63;  s.e =.548; F stat = 28.71
We also estimated  the same  basic equation  with monthly  dummies. The coefficients  remain
vely similar  in size and significance. Further examining  the coeflicients  on the time dummies,  we
observe  relatively  snall variation  across  months,  indicating  little  seasonal  movement  in the outflows  to
jobs.  There is no clear change in the size of these coefficients  over time.  We also explored these
relationships  for a smaller  sample of oblasts,  restricting  our attention  to European  Russia, some 39
oblasts, where a  significant  proprtion of Russian industrial activity is concentrated.  Here, the
coefficient  on the vacancies term is notably smaller - 0.2 - than for the full sample, but the general fit
of the estimation  is clearly  superior. Again,  we pick up no clear  trend in the size  of the time dummries.
How can these results  be interpreted  ?  Clearly,  the particularities  of the Russian  transition  are
important.  In the absence of subsidies and other supports, firns  are faced with the need to  reduce
labor hoarding. They have shyed  away from these decisions,  but over time as financing  options have
21  Applying a F test we reject the hypothesis that the lagged explanatory variables sum to unity and hence that
constant returns obtains.
37narrowed and  the reforms  appear irrevcrsible,  decreasing  returns in the formal  job market  arc what we
should expect, given initial conditions and the  path of  adjustment in  aggregate and  regional
employments.  The intcraction  between vacancics  in the cconomy  as a wholc and the flows out of
unemployment  arc very inexactly  captured. But on the assumption  lihat  registered  unemploymicnt  is a
stable share of true unemploymcnt,  the evidencc  of decreasing  rcturns suggests that the stock of
unemployed  as yet exerts an attenuated  influence  on hiring  decisions  and hence of outflows  to jobs.
Part of the reason is clear;  flows to jobs outside  the formal  sector often bypass  unemployment,  while
the formal  sector's  labor  demand  has tended to decline  over time,  as subsidies  and other supports  have
been  eroded. The effect  of vacancies  on flows to jobs can probably  be traced  to regional  mismatch  in
the distribution  of unemployed  and vacancies.
Further inspection  of individual  region  estimations  points  to a reasonably  conmmon  response  of
outflows  to unemployment  but far less so for vacancies. Starting  from the  hypothesis  that relatively
thick regional  markets  are far more  likely  to experience  constant  or increasing  returns,  we might  expect
this to show up for major  urban centers  -- like  Moscow  and St. Petersburg  - which  we know to have
experienced  relatively  large  flows. And  indeed  while  the size of the lagged  unemployment  term is large
in the case of Moscow,  the vacancies  term is negatively  signed  and this is also true for St. Petersburg.
This contrasts  with  the estimations  for the neighbouring  Moscow  and Leningad oblasts. The fact that
an increase  in posted  vacancies  appears  to be associated  with a fall in the outflow  to jobs likely  points
to an underlying  problem  of skill  mismatch. In Moscow,  for example,  most posted vacancies  are for
manual  and primarily  male  jobs; a significant  share  of the unemployed  are educated  women. Similar
features can be detected for a number  of the major industrial  regions  including  Nizhegorodskaia,
Krasnoiarskii  krai and Samaraskaia  oblast - with a negative association  between vacancies and
outflows. In the case of the larger urban  centers,  this component  of mismatch  can be traced to the
manner  in which  Russian  industrial  firms  have  initiaDly  tended  to shed  clen  .al and professional  staff  with
most of the flows in to firms  accounted  for by manual  or production  wt :kers 22. However,  in these
industrial  regions where the vacancies  sign  is perverse,  this can pardy be explained  by the very low
unemployment  rate in the oblast  associated  with strong  labor  hoarding  on the part of industrial  firms,  as
well  as the structure  of output in these locati:ons.
22This is well documented; see,  for  instance, Commander and Yemtsov  (1994)
38Conclusion
Russian unemployment  has proven rather elusive, including in statistical terms.  But one
thing is clear; the unemployed are significantly  in excess of those registcred at the Employment
Offices.  Yet strangely, while the latter series shows a clear upward trend -- with registered
unemployment  now above 2 percent -- more inclusive,  survey-based measures show rather little
trend since early 1992.  In  other words, unemployment  seems to  have ranged between 5-6
percent. indicating,  amongst other things, the size of the unemployment  inherited from the Sovict
period.
We report the findings  of a survey of the unemployed  and short time workers for 1  994q  1
which gives a true rate of no more than 5.4 percent.  Assuming  that those on extreme short time
are almost equivalent to the unemployed,  the immediate  employrnent  overhang amounts to  not
much more than 2 percent of the labor force.  That number  becomes  much larger, of course, if we
include all workers facing hours adjustment.  But this is not appropriate, in part because many
actually face quite limited contraction in working time. The survey results also indicate that for
those who experience a spell in unemployment,  durations  have remained  low with relatively  high
exit to job probabilities.
In short, even if we accept that the official statistics overstate output and employment
losses by simply  not capturing  the growth in the private sector, the contraction in net employment
has been small . Russia clearly  does not correspond to the general East European experience in
which employment  losses in the state sector became  large relatively  quickly.
But despite the gradual increase, there are clear signs  that unemployment  is rising and set
to rise further. The initial composition  of the unemployed  -- with its huge bias toward women --
has now disappeared and the incidence seems more widely spread.  Further, there is significant
regional dispersion,  with some of the more adversely  affected regions having  unemployment  rates
significantly  in excess of 10 percent. Labor mobility  is absent and, despite signs of wage flexibility
and  an emerging, conventional association at  regional level between changes to  wages and
unemployment,  it seems likely  that regional  variation will be long lasting, in part because of large
spatial mismatch  in the distribution of the unemployed  and jobs.  We write down a simple  model
designed to capture changes in relative region employment  and wages.  We indicate a number of
39channels by which relative employment and unemployment  are likely to  display a  trend with
persistence.
Finally,  our matching  functions  indicate  a decreasing  'efficiency' in matching  over time.
The coefficient  on the vacancies  term in the pooled estimation  is larger than that estimated  for
several  Eastern European economies  but there appears  to be quite large variance  over  individual
regions. Aside from hinting  at the problem of skill  mismatch  in some of  labor markets, the fact
that returns are decreasing  over time likely  picks  up the changing  behavior  by firms  with respect
to employment. This is evidently  related  to changes in firm sector access to subsidies  and other
financing  options. The obvious upward shitt in unemployment  that results is likely  to have rather
different  regional  consequences.
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40Appendix  I
A  model of region wage and employment  seting
We can now write down a simple  model which tries to capture the relative region effects
of shocks. Throughout, relative  wages and employment  are respectively  given as;
w=  i  W{t  where, Wj is the wage in region r at time t and Wt  is the mean wage in the economy
at time t.  The relative wage gives the deviation of the wage in the particuli region from the
average wage for the economy as a whole.  It will be positive (wa > 0) when the wage in the
region is greater than average  level (Wt  > W,) and negative  when (w,,  c 0).
n,  = IN/LN,FL  where, Nt fLFt  is employment in region r at time t, and N, /LF, is mean
employment  in the economy at time t.
The relationship  between relative employment  and relative  unemployment  is given by;
r{-1-,  ILF,  F  U,  Ll;I
At the level of each region, labor demand has a constant inverse  elasticity  dr and can be written as;
Wn  =  Cn-  (Nn,  / ]-  -")  r 
where C,, is a constant. The same relation can be generalized to the economy as whole. This
means that the relative wage, wt ,for region r is;
1wrt  =  i; w, =  II C,  -(NvL,k  N,  IL  J
It can be restated more simply  as
W,  = 4rt - dr -nn
where qr gives the position of the relative labor demand curve, so that,
17'= lC-"  .(N,/LF,)-  ]=1  C'  ]+(d -dr)  Xn[N,/LF,]
qn,  is positive when the region has a higher relative labor productivity  and higher relative elasticity
of labor demand. As such, the relative labor demand curve does not express relationship  between
41wage and employment;  it is expressed in terms of deviations of wages and employment from
average levels. Movements  in this curve do not give  changes in labor demand in the region but the
relative size of such changes as compared to the average level.
Similarly,  the relative  labor supply  function can be written as;
WI,  =  Vrt  + Sr  nr,
where v 1, gives the position of the relative  labor supply curve, so that,
V,t  =-  In|D"  INt I LF,)z-s  In  ID  (~S  -Sr)  * In[N, / L Fj
where D,t is the marginal  disutility of labor in a region.
Solving this system  of relative  labor demand and labor supply  equations we get;
nn, =  d-v,,  +  ,  s,  W  q  +s
d,  +s,  r'  d,  +s,.
We can introduce a disequilibrium  term, a parameter g, which sumnanrizes  a range of possible
factors, such as wage setting policies that are not region-specific, that might, by introducing
rigidities  result in  departures from equilibrium  wages and employment  so that;
Wr-:  = W.  -(l - J  r;  nd  = nf  -(l +d,  jr
We now consider the likely effect of shocks to relative employment  and wages arising from two
possibkl sources; a shock to  relative labor demand and a shock to  relative labor supply. In this
context, a shock to labor supply will not come about through migration, but may be important
given the initial conditions.  We know  that Russian participation rates were high and  that,
combined with demographics,  may imply  non-trivial labor supply effects in the transition. Thus,
shocks to labor demand  (which we assume however  will dominate) and labor supply will result in
shifting the parameters, qr, and v1,,
q,  I  - q,t  -tx;  v,,.  , - v,,  5--,,
where x, sumnarizes changes  in demand  for a region's goods and e, summarizes  changes  in labor
supply.
These shocks lead to changes  in relative employment  and wages,
d,  +6 5  Sr  dXr  -d,  - (
d,~~'  '~"  - d+Sr  s,  tr  F' 4rS4
42Using these equations we can relate changes in relative employment  and relative wages;
n,,,,  -nfl  = yI  (w  w')
where,
xr  - dr  51,  F
Yr r=[  x;+err  d,.  +Er)  .jrI  *
We now need consider the evolution of relative wages and employment  given shocks.  As
indicated  earlier, this will be sensitive  to the way in which regions interact with each other.  We
can think of this in terms of at least three channels. They can be represented in terms of the ability
to trade goods and services across regions; the ability to move capital across regions and, finally,
the ability of labor to  move across regions.  For our purposes, the  main assumption is that
mobility or workers and hence of migration is absent.  By contrast, we assume that capital can
move across regions and will do so.  It seems reasonable  to believe  that low relative wages in a
region (W,,  < W,) or wt < 0 will eventually  sponsor  job creation in that region and, in due course,
will lead to an increase in  relative  employment  23.
This implies  that the growth rate of employment  is proportional to the relative wage;
n,,  ;+  - n,,  =-at  wrr
or
n,r = -a  w,,
in continuous time. The parameter  a  summarizes  the degree to which capital is mobile.
Substituting changes in the wage for changes in employment,  we can also get an expression for
determining  the adjustment  over time of  the relative wage;
Wrt  =-  w*  r
which gives in continuous time, w,, = w,,*e  r
or in discrete time,
w  =W
23  Note that we could easily rewrite the above in terns of relative unemployment  given shocks. Further, we could
assume that wages were negatively  related to unemplayment at regional level, so that combining the relationship
between  relative wages, employment  and unemployment,  we get: W,  =  ull
43Clearly,  relative employment  will have the same time path as relative  wages and also will tend to
24 zero when t tends to infinity
We can now see that the parameter  T-E  in the time path of relative wages and employment
characterizes  the approximate  time for the adjustment process and can be expressed through the
main parameters  of our model.
T-  = a yr =  Xae  d;  - x+eri  ,
It  is inversely  proportional to  the incentive to  create new jobs (a)  and is proportional to  the
elasticity of labor supply in the case of labor demand shock (F,=O)  or to the elasticity of labor
demand in the case of labor supply shock (xr-O).  In the general case it is proportional to the
weighted  elasticity.
From the above, we can see that impact of shocks will depend on the relative weight of
labor demand as against labor supply shocks  and their relative elasticities. How long lasting these
shocks are will also depend on the job creation parameter, and hence implicitly  on the mobility  of
capital. In so far as job creation is driven by the movement in the relative  wage, the presence of
wage rigidities  will be important.
In our model, we can easily see that such rigidities might enter through two immediate
channels. The simplest type of relative wage rigidity arises through the distribution of relative
wages over all regions. As it follows  from the time path of w,,, there is inertia in  relative wages.
Regions with high (low) relative wage will tend to keep their wage above (below) the average
level over  the  adjustment. A second possible source could be through the  actions of  local
governments,  which we crudely characterize  by the parameter g,, . This might take the form of
intervention in  region-specific wage  setting, as,  say, through  maintenance of  earlier wage
relativities.  A third type of relative wage rigidity concerns the nonzero equilibrium  distribution  of
relative  wages  w,  and  may  be  introduced  with  the  help  of  the  following  equation
W,t  = -'r  -( Wr  - W',O).
24 It is the case only if the parameter  T.  is strictly positive.  But in some cases  it can become negative and instead
of convergence  of regional wages to the average level we can have  departures from that level.
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